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Concepts of political leadership have not been applied to the study of Westminster select (non-
legislative) committees, where analysis has largely focused on their institutional capacity to 
scrutinise government and hold it to account. Yet examining committees through a political 
leadership lens helps illuminate the complex role of committee chairs, a role which was 
significantly reshaped in 2010 when procedures changed to enable chairs to be elected by the 
whole House. This paper explores the select committee chair role, drawing on a series of 
interviews with chairs and committee members. It examines whether the term ‘leader’ can be 
usefully applied, and argues that, as chairs are now far more important parliamentary and policy 









Political leadership is a seductive area of study, rich with opportunities to analyse some of the 
‘great’ and ‘influential’ figures who are variously argued to have shaped our world and made the 
decisions which have changed the trajectories of contemporary societies. Parliament, by contrast, 
is an arguably less compelling field of study, largely because so much action and decision-making 
that is deemed consequential seems to take place outside of it, but also because, in Westminster 
style systems at least, the dynamics and interactions that determine parliamentary outcomes are 
rarely easily distilled into explanations focused around ‘key’ individuals. However, as the UK 
parliament has increasingly shifted towards committee-based scrutiny infrastructure, and sought 
to imbue that infrastructure with ever-growing capacity (at least potentially), particularly in terms 
of the role of the committee chair, ideas about political leadership can consequently provide a 
useful lens through which to study these committees and those who sit at their helms. This paper 
seeks to plot a new direction in the study of the Westminster parliament by exploring House of 
Commons departmental select committees in terms of political leadership, in order to 
understand the changing role of the committee chairs, who have, since 2010, been directly 
elected by the whole House, and who thus now possess an intriguing range of democratic 
resources which they did not previously enjoy. The analysis proceeds by exploring some of the 
relevant insights and debates from the political leadership literature, before sketching the 
institutional context in which select committees and their chairs operate, and what this means for 
conceptualisations of chair capacity in leadership terms. Finally, the paper analyses interview data 
gathered from select committee chairs and which directly probes the leadership dimension of 
their role. This paper is an early work in progress, which seeks to map the terrain in advance of 
definitively pitching the tent, and should be read as such. 
 
Leadership: concepts and themes 
The field of leadership studies is crowded with a multitude of accounts which seek to answer two 
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key questions: what is leadership, and how do we know it when we see it? (Rhodes and ‘t Hart 
2014, 3). These questions drive analyses into the nature of leadership as well as its consequences, 
and, in seeking to understand the positive role that leadership can play in society, scholars have 
devised many conceptualizations, and applied varied empirical strategies, in order to better 
understand it (Northouse 2010). Political leadership is a highly contested concept, both 
empirically and normatively, and a fundamental controversy concerns the compatibility of 
political leadership with democracy (Blondel 2014; Hendriks and Karsten 2014), because if the 
process of leadership involves someone influencing a group of individuals to achieve a common 
goal (Northouse 2010, 3), then this clearly raises questions both about the method of influence 
and the manner in which common goals are defined. Yet at the same time, democratic leadership 
springs from consent (Kane and Patapan 2012), which compels us to probe the nature of that 
consent and the way in which it both constrains and animates leadership across the many 
different democratic platforms through which it is exercised.  
 
To this end, political and organizational cultures are crucial to understanding the operation and 
consequences of leadership. Burns (1978, 425) defines leadership as ‘the reciprocal process of 
mobilizing, by persons with certain motives and values, various economic, political, and other 
resources, in a context of competition and conflict, in order to realise goals independently or 
mutually held by both leaders and followers.’ This definition advances understanding in two key 
ways: first, by qualifying ‘leader-centric’ accounts which focus largely on the actions of 
individuals in leadership positions; and second, by drawing into the analysis those whom leaders 
seek to lead as well as the context in which such leadership would occur. The crucial point here 
is that, in seeking to understand political leadership, we need to understand not just the 
motivations of leaders, but the motivations of those who follow, which is highly significant for 
the specific questions explored in this paper. Consequently, political leaders derive their authority 
not just from the democratic procedural arrangements through which they ascend to the top of 
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various organizational structures, but also from the ‘processual’ mechanisms through which 
leaders engage in exchange relationships with other actors (Hartley and Benington 2011, 207). In 
this view, the extent of the trust placed in leaders by followers delimits the bounds of political 
leadership in democratic societies (Ruscio 2004). 
 
Leadership and followership 
While leader-centred accounts may make for intriguing biographies of individual leaders, they do 
not tell us much about leadership itself (Burns 1978, 1-2), and contemporary scholarship therefore 
explores leadership ‘as an interactive process between leaders and followers; institutions and the 
rules of the game; and the broader historical context’ (Rhodes and ‘t Hart 2014, 6). Leadership is 
not simply a matter of ‘a leader acting and a group of followers responding in a mechanical way’, 
but is instead a highly complex social process in which the organizational cultural context is 
fundamental in shaping interactions (Alvesson 2011, 152). It is impossible to understand leaders 
without also understanding those they seek to lead, alongside the environment in which such 
leadership will occur, and a follower-centric approach to leadership analysis has largely eschewed 
individualistic and ‘heroic’ approaches (Meindl 1990, 1995). If the term ‘followership’ is 
controversial, such controversy is itself emblematic of the need to understand leaders and 
followers in context and in conjunction with each other, and also in relation to their 
organizational and social environments. Successful leaders are those who ‘succeed in appealing 
to, embodying or modifying the social identities of their followers’ (Rhodes and ‘t Hart 2014, 6). 
Crucially, as leadership involves ‘leaders inducing followers to act for certain goals that represent 
the values and the motivations … of both leaders and followers’, the ‘genius of leadership’ therefore 
involves drawing actors together ‘in pursuit of a common or at least joint purpose’ (Burns 1978, 
19).  
 
Yet, the very terms ‘leaders’ and ‘followers’ will have different meanings in different contexts, 
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and organizational culture will significantly determine whether actors even acknowledge them as 
meaningful to their regular interactions. While in some organizations, the leader/follower 
distinction will be clear and accepted terminology to all concerned, in others these definitions 
and their applicability will be far more fluid and open to debate. In particular, the identity, 
motivations and values of so-called followers will significantly shape leader-follower relations, 
which is why it is crucial to analyse the ‘proverbial ‘other side’ of the leadership coin’ (Bligh 2011, 
426) in order to truly understand political leadership. Context will at least in part determine 
whether actors within a given political organization are agreeable to the leader/follower 
terminology and distinction, not least because those who are already members of any given 
political elite (the focus of this paper) may balk at the very notion of contexts in which they are 
somehow defined as followers.  
 
Yet although there is debate about the use of the term ‘follower’ (Rost 2008, Burns 2005), the 
term is not in itself necessarily derogatory. Baker’s (2007) analysis, for example, demonstrates 
that both leaders and followers are roles rather than individual characteristics; that followers are 
active rather than passive; and that leaders and followers share common purposes rather than the 
former imposing purpose on the latter. Similarly, work on relational leadership theory (Uhl-Bien 
2006), leadership complexity theory (Uhl-Bien, Marion and McKelvey 2007), and distributed 
leadership (Gronn 2002) have in various ways sought to treat leadership as an ‘interactive 
dynamic relationship between organizational actors from which adaptive outcomes emerge’ and 
which similarly emphasize the importance of ‘interdependence, coordination and … reciprocal 
influence’ (Bligh 2011, 427). Research into followership has demonstrated that it has multiple 
meanings, and that followers construct those meanings not just in relation to their own 
individual perceptions, but also in relation to their organizational context and to the leaders with 
whom they interact (Carsten et al 2010). If we can jettison conceptions of great leaders and 
slavish followers, along with all the unhelpful baggage those conceptions entail, then we can 
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embrace approaches which conceive of leadership and followership as necessarily imbued with 
‘multiple, shifting, contradictory and ambiguous identities’ (Collinson 2005) which reflect the 
dynamics of the organizational terrain in which they operate. Finally, the idea of leadership as a 
distributed resource which is shared with followers is crucial to understanding its conceptual 
utility in the specific parliamentary context which forms the analytical focus of this paper.  
 
Contemporary leadership and governance 
Political leadership analyses focus largely on executives, with the study of US presidents and 
prime ministers in Westminster systems constituting particularly fertile fields for scholars to 
plough (for a sample see: Bennister 2014; Blick and Jones 2014; Foley 2000; Greenstein 1988, 
2009; Heffernan 2005; Hennessy 2000, McKay 2014; Neustadt 1960, 1980; Weller 2014). 
However, leadership as a political function is not confined to executive politics, and necessarily 
permeates any system of democratic governance. Different leadership styles and modes are 
required at different locations within governance systems, and we can consequently observe 
‘leadership constellations’ in which ‘several leaders provide counteracting checks and balances 
for each other’s positions and leadership roles’ (Hendriks and Karsten 2014, 52). To the extent 
that governance takes place through networks of interdependent actors (Rhodes 1997), effective 
political leadership consequently requires negotiation with stakeholders, and the capability to 
bind stakeholders together through various interaction process in the pursuit of common 
endeavours (Klijn 2014, 404). Goal alignments between leaders and followers only arise through 
complex interaction processes aimed at managing actors’ strategic behaviours (Klijn 2014, 406). 
Iterative collaboration is therefore fundamental for democratic governance (Ansell and Gash 
2008), and successful political leaders facilitate collaboration between participants through 
processes of negotiation and, crucially, by securing agreement about the end goals of 
collaboration. Collaborative leadership thus involves relationship-building between actors who 
may otherwise have no obvious motivation to work together, and because leaders must mobilise 
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actors they must also understand ‘other actors’ perceptions and desires about the problems and 
the solutions’ which they are tackling (Klijn 2014, 408). 
 
Therefore, if political leadership is necessarily dispersed in systems of democratic governance, it 
consequently makes good analytical sense to look beyond the usual suspects of presidents and 
prime ministers and party leaders when seeking to understand contemporary political leadership 
and its multiple iterations. This paper thus seeks to break new ground by analysing the UK 
parliament’s House of Commons scrutiny committees through the lens of political leadership. 
While studies of the US Congress often explore various aspects of legislative and committee 
political leadership (e.g. Caro 2002; Cooper and Brady 1981; Herrnson 1998; Smith 2007; Smith 
and Deering 1984), the UK parliament has not been subject to similar analyses. The United 
States’ system of federal and divided government clearly leaves congressional actors inhabiting 
fertile terrain for leadership analysts to plough, but the fusion of executive and legislature at 
Westminster, and its resulting power asymmetries in the context of majoritarian party 
government, does not automatically mean that political leadership is an empty category as far as 
parliament is concerned. There are arguably several different modes of analysis in relation to 
parliamentary political leadership, but this paper focuses on just one: leadership in the context of 
non-legislative executive scrutiny. The rest of this paper considers whether and how notions of 
political leadership can be analytically useful when examining this aspect of the Westminster 
parliament’s work, and what we can learn about parliamentary actors – specifically, House of 
Commons select committee chairs - when we conceive of them in leadership terms. 
 
The leadership context: the House of Commons and select committees 
Before we can determine whether ideas about political leadership can be usefully applied to 
House of Commons select committee chairs, we must first understand the parliamentary 
landscape in which these committees and chairs exist. The UK is known for its asymmetrical 
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political system, in which the resources of the executive significantly outstrip those of parliament 
and the MPs tasked with holding government to account (Judge 1993, Norton 2013). 
Committee-based infrastructures in most parliamentary systems are designed as antidotes to 
these sorts of power asymmetries, and in order to imbue a designated group of MPs with the 
necessary capacity to pursue scrutiny tasks away from the floor of the chamber, by dampening 
partisan instincts amongst MPs while simultaneously enhancing their interrogatory abilities vis-a-
vis executive actors. The House of Commons departmental select committee system was created 
in 1979 as a significant addition to parliament’s accountability toolkit, and is now recognised as 
facilitating a notable increase in the quality and quantity of (largely) non-legislative scrutiny to 
which government departments are subjected. These select committees shadow government 
departments, choose the topics of their own inquiries, and investigate the policy, administration 
and expenditure of departments and the various agencies and public bodies associated with them. 
Their work over the last three decades has been subjected to much assessment by parliamentary 
scholars (e.g. Drewry 1985; Giddings 1985, 1994; Judge 1992; Hindmoor et al 2009; Russell and 
Benton 2011), who have sought to analyse the impact of select committees on the outcomes of 
parliamentary scrutiny and whether they have enhanced the quality of oversight to which 
government is subjected, with the overall view generally tending to indicate a positive 
contribution, albeit with constraints and qualifications. It is clear that these committees have 
significantly expanded the range of scrutiny work undertaken by the House of Commons, have 
inquired into more issues and in more detail than was previously possible, have produced 
volumes of evidence about the operation of public policy, and published significant 
recommendations for policy and operational improvement, many of which have been adopted 
by government (Russell and Benton 2011). Through their various inquiries, select committees 
provide a public arena, or ‘theatre of action’ (Uhr and Wanna 2000), through which various 
government actors may be interrogated, evidence presented and queried, and arguments 
articulated regarding the focus and impact of public policy and executive decision making. In 
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some respects, the House of Commons’ committee scrutiny infrastructure arguably reflects 
Keane’s (2009, 688) conception of a shift towards post-representative or ‘monitory’ democracy, 
which is imbued with a profusion of checks and balances both inside and outside the 
representative regime, and in which elected officials and governments are subject to extensive 
scrutiny by other actors (Hendriks and Karsten 2014, 43). Although Keane’s is a post-
parliamentary view of democracy (2009, 688-691), the shift towards a more vigorous scrutiny 
infrastructure at Westminster is emblematic of post-parliamentary trajectories and the obvious 
desire of elected representatives to reverse them, and to attempt to disperse political power away 
from its traditional concentration in Whitehall. 
 
Quite obviously, however, the emergence and development of the Commons’ select committee 
system has not instigated an entirely upward trajectory of enhanced parliamentary scrutiny of the 
executive. Crucially, the organization and institutional identity of these committees has had 
significant consequences for their oversight capacity. When originally established, the 
membership of the committees was determined by the party whips, thus embedding into the 
system the Catch-22 that those responsible for scrutinizing the government would themselves 
largely be chosen by the government (as the committees reflect the party balance in the House, 
and thus have an in-built government majority). This led, in 2001, to a key flash-point in the 
development of the select committees, when a prominent MP from the governing Labour Party 
side, Gwyneth Dunwoody, was not re-nominated by the government whips for membership of 
the Transport Select Committee she had chaired in the previous parliament, undoubtedly 
because she had constituted a significant thorn in the side of government due to her highly 
activist approach to the chair role and her regularly vocal criticism of government policy (Kelso 
2003). This prompted a significant rebellion by MPs, who refused to authorize the government 
motion for the new committee memberships, thus sparking a period of intense reflection about 
the organization of the select committees and how they could be made more independent from 
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government. The following year, the parliamentary parties refreshed their internal processes for 
nominating MPs for select committee membership (Kelso 2009a), although nomination crucially 
remained a function of the parties rather than the House more broadly.  
 
Yet the continued ability of the executive to choose and influence the committee members who 
would scrutinise it continued to irk many MPs, who seized the opportunity of the 2009 MPs 
expenses scandal to revisit the question of select committee membership. Although the two 
issues were entirely unrelated, the scandal fuelled significant debate about the organization of the 
political system and how it might be made more responsive, and politicians made more 
accountable (Kelso 2009b). Reform-minded MPs capitalised on the tumult by quickly organizing 
to secure government support for an overhaul of select committee membership processes, which 
were approved in the final months of the Labour government. Consequently, when the new 
parliament met after the 2010 general election, the Commons select committees were appointed 
under new rules which crucially involved the entire House electing MPs to chair the select 
committees. New standing orders facilitated a process whereby the parties agreed between 
themselves which committees would be chaired by which parties, with the number of chairs 
assigned to each party in rough proportion to seat share. MPs subsequently put themselves up 
for election for the chair positions available to their party, and had to attract support from across 
the parties to get onto the ballot, before proceeding to canvas for the support of MPs votes 
across the House. With the committee chairs no longer essentially in the gift of the party whips, 
and with MPs compelled to secure cross-party support in order to be elected to the chair, this 
key development in the organization of the select committees had clear consequences for the 
perceived legitimacy of chairs and thus also for their resulting agency and capacity for action. 
 
It is in this context of the continued evolution of the select committees - in terms of their 
institutional identity, organizational structure, and scrutiny capacity – that questions about 
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parliamentary political leadership become relevant. The committee chairs are no longer viewed as 
creatures – indirect or otherwise – of the party whips, and their election by the whole House of 
Commons has had clear consequences for how the role is perceived (see below). To the extent 
that chairs can utilise the political capital derived from the legitimacy of election for particular 
political and/or organizational ends, and can use it in a way which advances the goals of the 
committees they chair and shapes the behaviour of the other committee members, it is clear that 
leadership of some form or other is in evidence. The select committee chairs are thus imbued 
with leadership potential because of their direct election by other MPs, and the key question is 
how that potential is actually used. If the purpose of elected committee chairs is to provide a 
parliamentary counterpoint to the executive’s monopoly of power on the one hand, and a 
parliamentary response to a shift in post-parliamentary scrutiny architecture on the other, then 
achieving either or both of these goals requires action to translate the political capital of chair-
ship into the political currency of leadership. Doing this requires considerable sensitivity on the 
part of the chairs to the nature of select committees, their membership and their work, and 
considerable awareness on the part of the researcher to what parliamentary leadership entails in 
practice. 
 
There has therefore been a significant strengthening of at least the potential capacity and 
institutional importance of select committee chairs as a result of their direct election by House of 
Commons MPs, and the individual role itself is now imbued with a democratic legitimacy which 
it did not possess before. So, in this respect, the characteristics associated with the chair role are 
clearly key factors in exploring whether that role can be usefully understood as one involving 
political leadership in some form. But as one of the key insights of leadership studies is that the 
operational context matters tremendously when analysing how leaders actually function, it is also 
essential to map the select committee environment in which chairs find themselves. At first 
glance, select committees appear relatively powerless in institutional terms. They have the formal 
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powers to call witnesses – such as government ministers - to give evidence, and to request 
information and documents from relevant stakeholders in order to run their inquiries. They 
publish all oral and written evidence received, and produce inquiry reports which detail what the 
committee discovered during any given inquiry, the conclusions it drew, and the 
recommendations it makes to specific policy actors in order to improve performance/outcomes 
etc. in the future. Government is not obliged to adopt these recommendations, although it is 
obliged to provide a written response to committee reports and to at least address the 
recommendations made. In this respect, the committees cannot compel governments to do 
anything, although research indicates a reasonably robust rate of adoption of committee 
recommendations, mostly at the specific operational level (Russell and Benton 2011). Although 
their cross-party membership means that select committee often steer clear of highly partisan 
inquiry topics, and stick to the operational detail of policy when they do look at divisive matters, 
the question of whether and how to criticise government policy and decision making will 
naturally present challenges for committee MPs. Those MPs on the government side may be 
hesitant about endorsing strenuous critiques, for obvious reasons, but neither will they wish to 
appear as ministerial lackeys. Similarly, opposition MPs on committees may seek to balance 
pressing any case they wish to make for including strong criticism in committee reports with the 
necessity of avoiding using the committee as an oppositional vehicle. In other words, the work 
of the select committee as a means of public policy inquiry and debate can only be maximized if 
committee MPs operate consensually. Clearly, whoever sits in the chair of such a committee has 
a key responsibility to ensure that consensual working is achieved, because otherwise the whole 
purpose of the select committee is defeated. 
 
Thus, the parliamentary and political context in which select committees exist, and the nature of 
the work they undertake, demands the deployment of particular leadership skills from committee 
chairs. Chairs must navigate the party preferences of the MPs who comprise committee 
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memberships, and also avoid offending the highly independent and fiercely autonomous 
sensibilities of MPs. Clearly, collaborative leadership of the sort delineated earlier is required in 
this context in order to generate the consensual outputs which underpin committee 
contributions to democratic governance. Nye’s (2008) distinctions between ‘soft’, ‘hard’ and 
‘smart’ power can be of some use in delineating the potential leadership strategies which may be 
open to a chair at the helm of a parliamentary select committee. However, as Blondel (2014, 714) 
notes, a more robust understanding of ‘smart power’ and its utilisation would incorporate how a 
leader is prepared ‘to examine the views of others and is prepared to rethink and assess what is 
being proposed as a result of objections raised by others’. In this view, smart leadership involves 
persuasion but also compromise. This is of crucial significance in understanding the extent to 
which political leadership is a meaningful category in the analysis of parliamentary select 
committees. 
 
Consequently, another key issue which problematizes political leadership in the context of select 
committees concerns the particular nature of the committee organization itself. Fundamentally, a 
select committee is a ‘team’ that is ‘composed of members who are interdependent, who share 
common goals, and who must coordinate their activities to accomplish these goals’ (Kogler-Hill 
2010, 241), and a leader is thus crucial to ensuring effective team working. Yet, the institutional 
position of select committees as consensual groups embedded in an inherently partisan 
organizational environment clearly presents unique challenges for committee chairs and their 
capacity to act as ‘team’ leaders. Committees comprise members whose loyalty to their party will 
always take precedence over the strategic goals of the committee, and chairs must therefore 
operate with a situational ‘mental model’ which is sensitive to the ‘contingencies that define the 
larger context of team action’ (Kogler-Hill 2010, 243). If ‘organizational cultures provide actors 
with sets of beliefs about the nature and role of leadership’ (Rhodes and ‘t Hart 2014, 6), then 
effective chairs are those who understand the constraints on, and limits to, a committee’s 
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scrutiny capacity as defined both by the specific parliamentary context and the broader political 
environment in which the committee operates. Organizational culture is clearly paramount, and 
leadership therefore requires a willingness not only to acknowledge the limitations created by 
that culture but also to generate adaptive responses to it (Shein 1992, 2) in order to advance 
committee goals. In this respect, select committee chairs are the quintessential ‘interactive leaders’ 
(Burns 1978, 15), rather than hyperactive ones. Leadership will necessarily be shared, in line with 
our earlier discussion, because committee chairs operate in a context in which all committee 
members are MPs who share an elite status, and in which the cross-party organizational dynamic 
renders notions of ‘followership’ quite difficult to sustain. 
 
Perceptions of leadership amongst committee chairs 
The previous sections explored how concepts of political leadership might offer interesting and 
useful insights into the role of House of Commons select committee chairs, and also sketched 
the select committee institutional environment in order to demonstrate the context within which 
these chairs operate. This all provides the necessary background through which to analyse a 
series of interviews conducted by the author between 2011-2013, with select committee chairs 
and members, which sought to examine their perceptions of the role of chair and the extent to 
which they understood that role in terms of ‘leadership’.  
 
Given the nature and purpose of select committee work outlined above, it is not surprising that 
chairs placed considerable emphasis on the need to foster collegiality. One committee chair 
perfectly expressed this goal when, with a wide grin, she remarked to the author at the beginning 
of the interview, ‘So, you are looking to see how we turn a group of disparate, strong-willed 
individuals into a pack animal?’ Her view was that most ‘outsiders’ (as she called them) failed to 
understand this essential metamorphosis which had to happen for committees to work even at 
the most minimal level. It necessarily took time, and did not just magically occur at the start of a 
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new parliament, but she insisted that ‘they do start to hunt as a pack, despite the fact that they’re 
from different political perspectives – it does happen’ (interview, 6 July 2011). The extent to 
which this transformation occurs is due in no small part to the leadership capacity and activity of 
the chair, in her view, in deliberately ‘breaking down that resistance’. For this chair, one of the 
key steps towards achieving this involved the committee members going overseas together on an 
fact-finding trip as part of an inquiry launched early in the new parliament. ‘Those who went on 
that trip,’ this chair argued, ‘came back as a more coherent group’ (interview, 6 July 2011). And 
not all trips had to be comparatively exotic: this chair also noted the utility of UK-based fact-
finding trips, and meetings with members of the public away from Westminster, as key to 
building a ‘team ethos’ around the particular policy focus of the committee and dampening 
partisan instincts. Several chairs reported the usefulness of away days and trips out of 
Westminster for building collegiality amongst committee members who might otherwise regard 
each other and their motivations somewhat warily. Being removed from the physical 
environment of Westminster, with its oppositional politics and spaces, and also traveling and 
eating together for sustained periods of time, enabled MPs to share their interests in terms of the 
policy focus of the committee, and to engage in discussions that were not easy in the 
Westminster setting. In this way, astute committee chairs used such opportunities as key 
leadership tools to help build the collegiality that was required for their committees to function 
effectively. 
 
Obviously, fact-finding trips and away days can go only so far in building collegiate committees, 
and much rests on the chair’s capacity to foster and sustain collegiality throughout the 
parliamentary year. As one Labour party committee chair explained, ‘One of the skills that a 
chair needs is an ability to operate in a collegiate manner, because select committee reports are 
pretty useless if they are divided’ (interview 4 July 2011). This chair added that chairs needed to 
have the skills to understand ‘that there are some political boundaries you will not be able to 
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cross’ when it comes to shifting the political positions of both government and opposition MPs 
on committees, and that chairs had to be able to handle the processes of compromise which 
imbued report drafting. Such compromise often involved the use of ‘carefully chosen’ language 
to ensure the resulting committee report did not ‘simply provoke’. But it also involved key stages 
before the report writing itself, for example by ensuring that those MPs who ‘have expressed 
doubts … have the opportunity to explore those doubts as part of the investigatory process’. In 
this view, a key chair skill involved using leadership to create space for MPs to vocalise concerns 
as part of the inquiry itself, in order to enhance the chances of defusing disagreement at the 
point of writing the report itself. Advanced and sensitive management of dissent is therefore 
crucial to successful committee chairing. 
 
Similarly, this chair was also emphatic that his role did not necessarily involve significant activism 
on his part. When asked how he approached his job of chairing an inquiry evidence session, this 
chair noted that the allocation of questions will already have been made in advance, and that the 
chair will often ask the first question or series of questions. Thereafter, however, he viewed his 
roles as: 
 
‘to try to keep us to time, which is sometimes difficult; to keep to the strategy; and 
when somebody has a smart idea, to make sure they catch my eye and they 
interject … So once the system is rolling, the most successful session is, in a sense, 
the one where I am totally quiet, because it’s all gone to plan and the right 
information has come out’ (interview, 4 July 2011). 
 
This view of the chair indicates a particular conception of leadership where the attention is not 
primarily focused on the chair at all, but one in which the chair acts as a facilitator and enabler 
for the other committee members. That does not mean the role is marginal, however. This chair 
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was clear that ‘the one thing you cannot do as chair is busk, and when you go the meetings, 
you’ve got to know what’s going on’ (interview, 4 July 2011), which is essential if the committee 
is to stick to its strategy and secure its broader inquiry goals in any given meeting.  
 
The challenges associated with committee leadership are different depending on whether the 
chair is a member of the party of government or opposition. One opposition party chair 
explained that his role was different to that of a government party chair, 
 
‘where it’s much easier [for the chair] to carry his own point of view, because he’s 
always got a majority. Again though, he’s got to handle dealing with the minority, 
and making sure that he gets buy-in from there. I’ve got a slightly different 
problem, in that the minority are more likely to share my view on a Political-with-
a-capital-P issue, but I’ve got to get buy-in from the majority …So there are 
different skills required in trying to maintain the momentum of the team.’ 
(interview, 4 July 2011) 
 
Another opposition party chair explained things similarly, stating that, as chair, it was important 
for her to spot clashes before committee meetings happened, and to work out ‘what the lines 
might be as to how far you can push, and who will accept what, in terms of getting the 
compromise’ (interview, 6 July 2011). Crucially, however, this chair did not seek to deal with 
conflict through private meetings: 
 
‘I don’t want the committee to think that I’m setting up cabals … because if I 
start to do that, they would start to do that. I’m trying to build a cohesive group 
of people who will come up with sensible suggestions that government might 




Instead, compromise was engineered in full committee, and using the skills of the committee 
clerks to help produce report language that all members could live with. As such, chairs lead not 
by individual heroic efforts in brokering agreements, but by making the entire committee 
responsible for securing consensus and drawing on all skill sets available to maximise success. 
This approach was similarly described by other committee chairs, and reflects the collaborative 
leadership style noted earlier. Thus, while committee chairs may now be elected, this does not 
mean they necessarily have the authority to impose their own preferred solutions on divided 
committees. Democratic legitimacy may enhance their chances of securing cooperation, but 
chairs are still compelled to draw on a range of institutional resources to secure successful 
outcomes. 
 
This leads to the clear differences expressed amongst committee chairs about whether they 
would characterise their role as one of leadership. One chair was clear that: 
 
‘It is a leadership role. It’s similar to the skipper of any team. You’ve got to keep 
people focused on the job in hand, occasionally deal with details that prohibit 
them [being involved] … and just make sure that all of them have got the 
opportunity to engage fully’ (interview, 4 July 2011). 
 
Another chair agreed that ‘there is a leadership role’, and connected this not only to the broad 
programme of work undertaken by a committee, but also specifically to the chair role in terms of 
managing the inquiry report-writing process, media relationships, and interactions with external 
stakeholders, ‘where you do lead in those senses’ (interview, 4 December 2012). One chair 
explained his committee chair role in terms of ‘providing leadership in the committee, and to be 
the external face of the committee’, which clearly has implications for public visibility that he 
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believed committee members accepted as a fundamental aspect of the chair leadership role 
(interview, 12 July 2012). This chair agreed that he acted in a leadership capacity, and explained 
that this capacity ‘has got nothing to do with my status, seniority, age or anything else … I have 
been elected to do the job, I’m paid to do the job … and I give more of my time and my 
commitment than any other committee member as a consequence’ (interview, 12 July 2012).  
 
Another very experienced chair reflected that: 
 
‘I wouldn’t put a label around my neck saying ‘I am the leader’, because they [the 
committee members] might feel you need taking down a peg in that case. But it is 
a leadership role. And actually committee members do look at you in that way, 
and expect you to show leadership to them. They will come with different and 
often conflicting ideas, and as with any leader, although it might not have been my 
first thought, my sense is that we will go with that if there’s enough support and 
interest. But at other times, you might need to make the committee realise that 
there’s something they’ve got to do which shouldn’t be neglected, and that’s a 
leadership role. They [the committee members] also expect you to fight on their 
behalf.’ 
 
One chair gave a particularly insightful description of her chair role, and its dynamic dependence 
on the rest of the committee membership, when she explained that: 
 
‘I’m a leader, but I’m very conscious that I’m in the hands of the committee, and I 
have to keep their confidence, and have their agreement on what I’m doing, or we 
would have a very divided committee, and that would damage it’s work’ (interview, 




It may seem obvious enough that leaders can only lead if they have the support of those with 
whom they work, but the political context in which select committees operate makes this 
especially salient. This particular chair explained, for example, that during the course of an 
inquiry she had been very vocally critically of the responsible government minister, and that ‘the 
committee has supported me in that criticism’ (interview, 20 June 2011). She called the 
committee together for the express purpose of securing their agreement in advance of issuing 
her highly critical comments, precisely because she needed the committee to maintain a position 
of consensus for her criticism as chair to have any value. She further noted that, as a member of 
the opposition party, it was even more important for her to ensure that the government-side 
MPs on her committee would be agreeable to this course of action. In this instance, as in so 
many others affecting select committee work, consensus is king. 
 
One chair from the government side, explained that, when he had originally sought election to 
his committee chair, he had made it clear to MPs: 
 
‘that I wasn’t interested in being a chair that simply sat on the sidelines and 
offered some kind of running commentary. What I wanted to do was to engage 
the select committee, real time, in the policy making process.’ (interview, 24 May 
2011) 
 
He believed that direct election had helped him fulfil his more expansive role for the chair, but 
he was nonetheless hesitant about describing himself as a ‘leader’, offering the word ‘catalyst’ 
instead (interview, 24 May 2011). When pressed on why ‘leader’ was an unsuitable term, he 
responded that, ‘it implies that others are followers, and that’s not necessarily how Members of 
Parliament like to see themselves!’ This insight accurately captures the dilemmas at the heart of 
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the leader-follower debate, and the unease that exists concerning the applicability of the notion 
of ‘followership’ as an essential component of ‘leadership’. And this view was not isolated. 
Another chair similarly rejected the idea that she was a leader of her committee, saying she 
‘would rather be the facilitator … rather than leader’ (interview, 6 July 2011). Yet her description 
of her role echoed that of her chair colleague who did accept the leadership label, even down to 
the detail of explaining that good committee chairs tend not to be noticed as such by their 
members. Similarly, she argued that the extent to which the chair could ‘set the tone’ of a 
committee, and ‘encourage everyone to contribute’ was the determining factor ‘in whether 
you’ve got a functioning select committee or a dysfunctional one’ (interview, 6 July 2011). The 
fact that two senior committee chairs could both use very similar language to describe the role 
and importance of the chair, but then take differing views on whether that role constitutes 
leadership, reveals much about the nature of MP interactions inside select committee 
environments, the particular political context of committees, and hesitation over how MPs might 
conceptualise committee chair roles given that their primary leadership touchstones will be those 
at the top of their own parties. 
 
Note: time/space limitations have prevented me from exploring the views of non-chair select committee members 
regarding leadership – will appear in a later version. 
 
Conclusion: Committee leadership in perspective 
This paper offers only a brief flavour of some of the interesting perspectives collected during 
interviews with select committee chairs: this is an early draft of a work in progress, and much 
remains to be done, not only with the relevant literatures in the field of political leadership, but 
also with the rich collection of interview materials collected. A few very brief concluding 




First, the shift inside the House of Commons towards elected select committee chairs has 
facilitated their emergence as significant and potentially highly resourceful parliamentary actors. 
With their connective tissue to the party business managers largely severed – as far as their 
institutional positioning is concerned - chairs evidently now utilise their democratic legitimacy 
not just as a scrutiny tool, but also as a leadership resource. They are empowered in ways they 
never were before, and this makes their analysis all the richer. 
 
Second, and linked to the above point, committee chairs are ultimately responsible for making 
their committees function as effective scrutiny vehicles, and this means they must work to foster 
collegiality amongst MPs who naturally bring different party perspectives to bear on the policy 
inquiries pursued, and may indeed be serving on the select committees for a range of different 
reasons not all of which will be concerned with some notion of advancing the public good 
through political inquiry. That committees comprise these disparate types of individuals, with 
different views and different motivations for involvement, consequently involves chairs 
deploying any number of crucial leadership skills and strategies in order to advance committee 
goals. Exploring how chairs perform these tasks and successfully (or unsuccessfully) deliver 
useful scrutiny outputs provides a compelling insight into how actors operate in complex 
institutional contexts where actors possess competing loyalties. Crucially, it also affords an 
insight into how those actors behave as leaders in an environment where all MPs on a committee 
are already members of the political elite, and already acknowledge leadership (party leadership) 
through other channels. 
 
Third, this work seeks to map new terrain by analysing parliament from a fresh perspective. 
While questions about internal organization and processes, scrutiny and oversight capacity, 
executive-legislative relations, and so on, are all obviously important avenues for exploration, this 
paper seeks to provide a new lens on their analysis by employing ideas about political leadership 
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in the parliamentary context. Applying this perspective to the role of select committee chair, a 
crucially positioned institutional actor, not only helps us better understand how these committees 
are organized and function, but also begins the process of mapping what it means to be a 
parliamentary political leader outside the framework of parliamentary party leadership. 
Conceiving of select committee chairs as political leaders inside parliament can thus reposition 
our understanding of chairs – as begun through the interview material presented here – but also 
provide empirical insights that help flesh out some of the useful literatures on contemporary 
political leadership. In particular, the specific features of select committee membership offer 
superb opportunities to explore the contested and controversial idea of followership, which the 
discussion and interviews demonstrate is a slippery concept when applied to political elites such 
as MPs in cross-party committee environments. This work also provides evidence to support the 
useful advancement of leadership analyses that go beyond studies of presidents, prime ministers, 
and party leaders, by applying the perspective to somewhat more lowly political figures who may 
not automatically spring to mind in the context of political leadership, but who are performing 
important leadership roles nonetheless. Future development of this paper will therefore seek to 
expand our understanding of what political leadership is, the various institutional contexts in 
which we find it, and how leadership perspectives can enrich our understanding of parliamentary 
politics. It will also seek to develop a conceptual approach to this idea of parliamentary political 






Alvesson, M. (2011) ‘Leadership and organizational culture’ in A. Bryman, D. Collinson, K. 
Grint, B. Jackson and M. Uhl-Bien (eds.) The Sage Handbook of Leadership (London: Sage). 
 
Ansell, C. and Gash, A. (2008) ‘Collaborative governance in theory and practice’, Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 18:4, 543-71. 
 
Baker, S.D. (2007) ‘Followership: the theoretical foundation of a contemporary construct’, Journal 
of Leadership and Organizational Studies, 14:1, 50-60. 
 
Bennister, M. (2012) Prime Ministers in Power: Political Leadership in Britain and Australia (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan). 
 
Blick, A. and G. Jones (2014) ‘The contingencies of prime ministerial power in the UK’ in 
R.A.W. Rhodes and P. ‘t Hart (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
 
Bligh, M.C. (2011) ‘Followership and follower-centred approaches’ in A. Bryman, D. Collinson, 
K. Grint, B. Jackson and M. Uhl-Bien (eds.) The Sage Handbook of Leadership (London: Sage). 
 
Blondel, J. (2014) ‘What have we learned?’ in R.A.W. Rhodes and P. ‘t Hart (eds.) The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Leadership (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 




Burns, J.M. (2005) ‘Leadership’, Leadership, 1, 11-12. 
 
Caro, R.A. (2002) Master of the Senate (London: Jonathan Cape). 
 
Carsten, M.K., Uhl-Bein, M., West, B.L., Patera, J.L., and McGregor, R. (2010) ‘Exploring social 
constructions of followership: a qualitative study’, The Leadership Quarterly, 21:3, 543-562. 
 
Collinson, D.L. (2005) ‘Dialectics of leadership’, Human Relations, 58:11, 1419-1442. 
 
Cooper, J. and D.W. Brady (1981) ‘Institutional context and leadership style: The House from 
Cannon to Rayburn’, American Political Science Review, 75:2, 411-25. 
 
Drewry, G. (1985) ‘The 1979 reforms – new labels on old bottles?’ in G. Drewry (ed.) The New 
Select Committees: A Study of the 1979 Reforms (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
 
Foley, M. (2000) The British Presidency: Tony Blair and the Politics of Public Leadership (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press).  
 
Giddings, P. (1985) ‘What has been achieved?’ in G. Drewry (ed.) The New Select Committees: A 
Study of the 1979 Reforms (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
 
Giddings, P. (1994) ‘Select committees and parliamentary scrutiny: plus ca change?’ Parliamentary 
Affairs, 47:4, 669-86. 
 





Greenstien, F.I. (2009) The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Barack Obama 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press). 
 
Gronn, P. (2002) ‘Distributed leadership as a unit of analysis’, The Leadership Quarterly, 13:4, 423-
452. 
 
Hartley, J. and J. Benington (2011) ‘Political leadership’ in A. Bryman, D. Collinson, K. Grint, B. 
Jackson and M. Uhl-Bien (eds.) The Sage Handbook of Leadership (London: Sage). 
 
Heffernan, R. (2005) ‘Exploring (and explaining) the British Prime Minister’ British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations, 7:4, 605-20. 
 
Hendriks, F. and N. Karsten (2014) ‘Theory of democratic leadership’ in R.A.W. Rhodes and P. 
‘t Hart (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
Hennessy, P. (2000) The Prime Minister: The Office and its Holders since 1945 (London: Penguin). 
 
Herrnson, P.S. (1998) ‘Directing 535 leading men and leading ladies: party leadership in the 
modern Congress’. In H.F. Weisberg and S.C. Patterson (eds.) Great Theatre: The American Congress 
in the 1990s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Hindmoor, A., Larkin, P., Kennon, A., (2009) ‘Assessing the influence of select committees in 
the UK: the Education and Skills Committee 1997-2005’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 15:1, 71-89. 
 
Judge, D. (1992) ‘The ‘effectiveness’ of the post-1979 select committee system: the verdict of the 
27 
 
1990 Procedure Committee’, Political Quarterly, 63:1, 91-100. 
 
Judge, D. (1993) The Parliamentary State (London: Sage). 
 
Kane, J. and H. Patapan (2012) The Democratic Leader: How Democracy Defines, Empowers and Limits 
its Leaders (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
Keane, J. (2009) The Life and Death of Democracy (London: Simon and Schuster). 
 
Kelso, A. (2003) ‘Where were the massed ranks of parliamentary reformers? Attitudinal and 
contextual approaches to parliamentary reform’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 9:1, 57-76. 
 
Kelso, A. (2009a) Parliamentary Reform at Westminster (Manchester: Manchester University Press). 
 
Kelso, A. (2009b) ‘Parliament on its knees: MPs’ expenses and the crisis of transparency at 
Westminster’ Political Quarterly, 80:3, 329-338. 
 
Klijn, E.H. (2014) ‘Political leadership in networks’ in R.A.W. Rhodes and P. ‘t Hart (eds.) The 
Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
Kogler-Hill, S.E. (2010) ‘Team leadership’ in P.G. Northouse Leadership: Theory and Practice 
(London: Sage).  
 
McKay, D. (2014) ‘Leadership and the American presidency’ in R.A.W. Rhodes and P. ‘t Hart 




Meindl, J. (1995) ‘The romance of leadership as a follower-centric theory: a social constructionist 
approach’, The Leadership Quarterly, 6:3, 329-341. 
 
Meindl, J.R. (1990) ‘On leadership: an alternative to conventional wisdom’, Research in 
Organizational Behaviour, 12, 158-203. 
 
Neustadt, R.E. (1960) Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York: Wiley). 
 
Neustadt, R.E. (1980) Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter (New York: 
Wiley). 
 
Norton, P. (2013) Parliament in British Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). 
 
Nye, J.S. (2008) The Power To Lead (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
Rhodes, R.A.W. (1997) Understanding Governance (Buckingham: Open University Press). 
 
Rhodes, R.A.W. and P. ‘t Hart (2014) ‘Puzzles of political leadership’ in R.A.W. Rhodes and P. ‘t 
Hart (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
Rost, J. (2008) ‘Followership: an outmoded concept’. In R.E. Riggio, I. Chaleff, and J. Lipman-
Blumen (eds.) The Art of Followership: How Great Followers Create Great Leaders and Organizations. (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass). 
 




Russell, M. and Benton, M. (2011) Selective Influence: The Policy Impact of House of Commons Select 
Committees (London: The Constitution Unit). 
 
Shein, E.H. (1992) Organizational Culture and Leadership (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc.). 
 
Smith, S.S. (2007) ‘Party influence in Congress’ in S.S. Smith, J.M. Roberts and R.J. Vander 
Wielen (eds.) The American Congress Reader (New York: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Smith, S.S. and Deering, C.J. (1984) Committees in Congress (Washington D.C.: Congressional 
Quarterly). 
 
Uhl-Bein, M. (2006) ‘Relational leadership theory: exploring the social processes of leadership 
and organizing’, The Leadership Quarterly, 17:6, 654-676. 
 
Uhl-Bien, M., Marion, R., and McKelvery, B. (2007) ‘Complexity leadership theory: shifting 
leadership from the industrial age to the knowledge era’, The Leadership Quarterly, 18:4, 298-318. 
 
Uhr, J. and J. Wanna (2000) ‘The future roles of parliament’ in M. Keating, J. Wanna and P. 
Weller (eds.) Institutions on the Edge? Capacity for Governance. (Sydney: Allen & Unwin). 
 
Weller, P. (2014) ‘The variability of prime ministers’ in R.A.W. Rhodes and P. ‘t Hart (eds.) The 
Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
